Atonement got its approval. Residents deserve the full story.

01

Same pavement. Less land. A larger exception.

The proposal divides an approximately 2.36-acre property. Lot 1 would retain the church and parking in the R-1 Low Density Residential district. Lot 2 would contain the former Borough Hall/community center, now in the T-C Town Center Residential/Office district.

Nick Perilli’s August 26 zoning memorandum gives these figures for the remaining church lot: [1]

No new church construction or paving was proposed. The percentages increase because the church and parking would occupy a smaller lot. The applicant’s engineer identified Lot 1 as the land needing these variances; no variance was requested for Lot 2. [6, 27:00–28:14]

The paved-coverage increase is 4.9 percentage points. The resulting 41.8% is more than twice the ordinary limit. Those are different comparisons, and both belong in the explanation.

This variance approval does not itself complete the subdivision, record the new lots or close the sale.

No new pavement does not mean no zoning consequence: the proposed split would increase the church lot’s existing nonconformity.

02

The parking history did not begin with this sale

Borough records trace decisions and concerns over more than a decade:

• 2013–2016: Council approved a second-driveway waiver in February 2013. Later minutes recorded residents’ community-center parking complaints and referenced an April 28, 2016 church-staff letter about parking. [7]
• June 2019: Planning Commission minutes described demolishing the parsonage at 65 Wyomissing Boulevard, annexing its lot to the church property and adding 26 parking spaces. They reported earlier relief allowing 36.24% paved coverage, eight narrower spaces, and exceptions to vegetative-cover and raised parking-island requirements. Council then granted conditional final plan approval, 6–0, subject to McCarthy Engineering’s May 15 review letter. [2–3]
• September 2025: An engineering review identified an internal line through the southern parking lot that was not shown as extinguished. It warned that the plan would therefore produce three parcels instead of two, and requested parking calculations for each lot. [4, pp. 2–3]

The parsonage lot involved in the parking expansion is not the community-center portion now proposed for sale. That distinction is essential to following the property history.

The 2019 minutes establish a proposal and conditional approval. The original zoning decision, final recorded plan and completion records are still needed to establish exactly what was built and which conditions remain. Those minutes also contain an apparent date error: they describe a prior variance as occurring in November 2019, after the June meeting. The original decision should resolve it.

The 2025 lot-line comment likewise does not establish that the September 2026 plan remained defective. It identifies a specific issue whose resolution should be documented.

Was the land now being separated part of the acreage supporting earlier parking relief? Which landscaping conditions survived? What explains the difference between the 36.24% reported in 2019 and the current 36.9%? The records reviewed do not yet answer these questions; the different percentages alone do not prove unauthorized paving.

Before granting another exception, the public should be shown how earlier approvals, property lines and continuing conditions fit together.

03

An exhibit number is not an explanation

Earlier hearings included sworn staff testimony. In February’s Atonement hearing, Zoning Hearing Board solicitor Dan Becker questioned hearing secretary Michele Bare about notice and procedural records, then questioned the previously sworn zoning officer about his review and memo. Bare’s notice testimony and Perilli’s zoning review served different purposes. [8]

The September procedure was different. Becker identified Perilli’s August 26 memo as Board Exhibit 8 and admitted it with the other Board exhibits. The available video-derived working record identifies an oath for the three applicant witnesses, but records no oath or oral testimony from Perilli at this hearing. [6, 8:29–9:32]

A related change in exhibit handling appeared at an earlier hearing. At the July 22 hearing on another property, Becker described a revised practice of introducing Board exhibits at the beginning. Later discussion confirmed that the former staff notice-and-procedure segment would no longer occur. No formal written policy establishing that change was among the records reviewed. [9]

The memo was evidence on the record. The chair also read an opening summary covering much of its application description, including the previous denial and the requested percentages. But neither the public memo nor that summary supplied the missing account of the earlier parking approvals and conditions. [1; 6, 1:44–2:57]

The Borough ordinance assigns the zoning officer recordkeeping responsibilities for applications, approvals and reports, along with responsibilities concerning nonconformities and reports to the Board. It does not expressly require a complete oral property history at every hearing. [10, §800.2]

The practical issue is how the staff review could be examined once the memo had been admitted. Which historical records did Perilli review? How did they affect his conclusions? Why was he not called to explain that work under oath? The materials reviewed do not show him refusing an oath or establish why he did not testify.

Entering a memo into evidence leaves a separate question: who explains—and answers questions about—the facts behind it?

04

Public comment needs an accessible public record

The Borough’s three-page September packet contains Perilli’s two-page memo and the hearing notice. The memo therefore cannot fairly be described as a document that was never released. [1]

That packet is not the complete set of marked hearing exhibits. The notice offered inspection of the application, plans and attachments at Borough Hall; Becker offered spare exhibit copies at the hearing. Those facts do not establish when the full materials were available online, exactly what the spare sets contained, or whether residents had a practical opportunity to study them before the vote. [1, p. 3; 6, 6:45–7:01]

At the beginning of the hearing, Becker explained that people seeking to present a case and question witnesses should request standing. Later, residents attempting to ask questions were directed to make comments instead; Becker stated that no one had requested standing. Residents raised the property history and T-C zoning during their comments without receiving a corresponding historical explanation before the vote. [6, 5:05–6:40; 32:43–35:21]

Pennsylvania law gives parties rights to present evidence, respond and cross-examine, and addresses the opportunity to contest staff memoranda. Those rights are not automatically identical for every observer. Nor does the absence of an oath for a memo’s author, by itself, establish that admitting it was unlawful. [11, §908]

But a public process should be understandable before the opportunity to participate passes. Explain the participation rules plainly. Publish a complete, labeled exhibit set early enough to read. Explain substantive staff conclusions. Make clear how residents can challenge evidence rather than merely speak after it has been accepted.

Residents cannot meaningfully test evidence they have not had a fair chance to examine. Access must be useful before the vote, not merely possible afterward.

05

Who on the Board had ties to the church?

Residents deserve clarity about the decision-makers’ relationships with the applicant. Did any participating Board member belong to Atonement, serve as an officer or trustee, have a financial or professional relationship with it, or participate in its property-sale decisions? What was disclosed, and how was impartiality addressed?

There is a documented example elsewhere in this case: Planning Commission member Frederick Mogel abstained from the August 4, 2025 rezoning recommendation because of his affiliation with the organization. That was a different body and does not establish any Zoning Hearing Board member’s affiliation. It does show that the subject has already mattered in the public record. [12]

No discussion of Board members’ church relationships appears in the video-derived working record reviewed for this article. The records reviewed do not establish a disqualifying relationship. Ordinary church membership does not, by itself, establish a duty to recuse; leadership, financial interests and involvement in the application require their own assessment. [15]

The public should be able to judge the decision on a disclosed record, without having to guess about decision-makers’ relationships with the applicant.

06

A home was already allowed. Why change the zoning?

The applicant’s own letter answers the question. C2C Design Group’s July 7, 2025 request said the church intended to subdivide and sell Lot 2 and sought rezoning “to allow for additional available uses for Lot 2.” [5, p. 2]

THE APPLICANT’S OWN WORDS · JULY 7, 2025

The August Planning Commission minutes discussed possible commercial, professional and residential uses. On December 9, Council adopted Ordinance 1456-2025, moving 15,821 square feet from R-1 to T-C by a 6–1 vote, with Ronald Stanko opposed. No specific project had yet been determined. [12–13]

Both districts allow a detached single-family home by right. T-C changes much more than the label:

Source: zoning ordinance §§404 and 474. Additional standards apply, including T-C’s 30% minimum open area. Street-line width increases under T-C; it is not a reduced-frontage benefit. [10]

T-C also allows offices, financial institutions, two-family detached dwellings and up to two apartments above a permitted special-exception use through special-exception review. It does not authorize any commercial business an owner chooses; a stand-alone nail salon is not expressly listed among its principal uses. [10, §§472–475]

September’s oral approval restricted the relief to single-family residential use, excluding apartments, offices and similar uses. But the coverage variances concerned Lot 1—the church and parking—while the proposed home would occupy Lot 2. [6, 27:00–28:14; 40:30–41:37]

A sale alone does not erase an applicable zoning condition. [16] If the residential restriction does not bind Lot 2, a future owner could seek other uses allowed under T-C, subject to required approvals and other applicable restrictions. [10, §§472–475]

The Board’s written decision needs to connect the restriction to the correct land—Lot 2—and make clear that it binds future owners. The September written decision was not among the records reviewed. That decision and any plans and testimony it incorporates are needed to establish the restriction’s precise scope. [6, 40:30–41:37]

The rezoning opened broader possibilities. The written approval must show how the residential restriction binds Lot 2 and its future owners.

07

A buyer is not the whole variance case

Church representative Jeff Good, listed as congregational council vice president in Atonement’s September 2026 newsletter, described the unused building’s maintenance burden. Prospective buyer Geoff Fleming described converting it into a residence. Reusing the building is a benefit residents can understand. [6, 12:10–15:27; 20:49–22:30; 14]

The variance standards still require findings about hardship, the property’s conditions, neighborhood effects and whether the relief is the minimum necessary. A voluntary subdivision calls for a clear explanation of whether the claimed hardship was self-created. The same coverage request had been denied in February; September brought a prospective buyer and a residential proposal. What changed in the findings that justify the relief? [1; 11, §910.2]

The Board imposed a residential-use restriction and standard conditions. The Board granted the variances without adding a specific requirement to reduce pavement, add landscaping or address stormwater as mitigation in the conditions it announced at the hearing. Whether such measures are appropriate requires the site record and existing obligations—not an assumption that a particular engineering solution is feasible. [6, 40:30–41:37]

The materials reviewed do not establish that the approval was unlawful. They do establish why the written findings and earlier conditions matter.

A worthwhile reuse deserves consideration. It also deserves a written explanation of how this subdivision meets the variance standards.